Tilts paper surveys several approaches to semanttc-netw,~rk semantics that have not previously been treated ~n the AI or computattonal lingutsttcs hterature, though there ~s a large ptulu. ~)ph~cal hterature invest)gating them m ~mledetad. In parttcular, proF~n~onal semanttc networks (exemphhed hv ~,NeP%)are dis cus.~d, it ts argued that ~mlv a Iull'; mtenstonal ("Mem(mgtan") semantics is apprt)prtate I(~r them. and se'~eral \|eln(~nglan svstenls are presented.
SEMANTICS OF SEMANTIC NETWORKS.
~emantlc netw¢~rks have pr(~ed rt~ I~ a uselul dahl ,,true.lure for representing mlormatttm. =.e., a "knt~wledt, e'" repre~ntatmn svs tenn. (A I'~tter termmtdogv ix "'belief" teptexentatiott system; t.f. I~>hrnw and Win(~grad's KRI. (1977) , ,,r IIra~.hman',, KI.() ',I. (1979,) , bear strong tamttv re~mblanues t() "l'.wphvrv',, I'ree'" (I ~t,.
2)---a mediaeval device u.~d t~> dlustrate the .\r:st,.~ehan 'het,rv ,~I definn~(m by ~pe~:e~ and d~fferent~a ((-I. Kret~'mann I~'hh. ('It 2; Kneale and Kneale It~hh: 232) . It has been r~,nted (~ut that titere ~s nothing essentmlly "~emanttc" about semantic networks (llendnx 1979; hut cf. Woods 1975 . Brachman 1979 . Indeed. v~ewed ,as a data structure, it is arguable that a semantic network m a language (r,,~.,~lhlV w~th an a~st~lated Ingle (~r ~nference mechanmm) f(~r representing inlornlatl(}n ah~)ut ,aline d(,mam, and, as such, IS a purely syntactic entity. They have (-(~me to he (-ailed "semanttc'" primarily hecau.~ ~d their uses as wart, ~ll representing tile meanings (~f hngutstic !tems¢.
As a notatt(mal device, a semanuc net'a.'tlrk ~an ~tseil be g~','en a semantic,s. That is, the art, s. nc,Jes, and rules (~l :. semantic net~,'(irk representational system (.an 1~' given interpretations, in terms (if the entities they are u~d tit represent. Witilout ~;uch a semantics, a semantic network is an arhltrar'¢ not-':tt(mal dev;ce Imble tt~ mtsmterpretat=on tel. Wtx.ds 1975; I!,rathman i977. 1983; Mclgerm~ltt 1981 ) . The task (~! prov:ding a semantt~s For semantic networks is more ak=n tt~ the task t)f providing a ,~mant~cs For a language than I'()r a logic. ,crate in the latter ca.;e, hut not m the l~rmer, nt,tltms like al gunte;~t validity mu,d Fn: c,,Iahllshed and ctmneLthHl'~ rl~u~.l |~' made with JXl(~nl?., ,nd rules ~1 Hllerent,¢. ~ui-nltrl,ltlng ideall',' Ill ',,~undne~', and Ltmtpletene,,,, thet~rem',. }lut unllerlvinu the h~glc"~ ~.enlantlL:~, there must P~ ,k ~;erllafltlcs I(ir the Itlglc',¢ underlvin~ I.lngthl~.e. alltl thl,~ ~.~.L~uh.I h~ ~lkell in terms ~l '~uLh .i rltlfll~n ,1~ llldJflnitt,~. Ilere. tvpltallv, .in inlerpret.dlL~n lunc tl(in IS e~tahllshed P~t~.~.een K"*'tttdLtlCa[ iter11~ Irtlnl the language l, and ~lntt~l~lc;Jl items Inml rile "~(~rtd'" W lhat the langua~de is t() de~t, rlt)e. J'hts, m turn. ~ u~,uall~, at.conlphsiled b',' dexcrdlm~ the 'Aorld in .in{ither language. 1, . and '~htl~.lng that /'. and /'4 are nld.ll'l(in;ll V,lrt;infs hv ,~ho',X.'lng that tile'*' ,ire l~m{)rphl(-.
Recentlv. hngu~sts and phdosopilers have at'cued for the ~ml'*~lrranke (~1 intenaional ,~..muntlt:S For natural languages (t;l'. ~lon-tat;tie 1(~7. 1. I~ar,~ms 1981) . Rapar~lr? 1981L .-\t the same t~me, computat~tmal Ilnt~ulS(~; and ~ther .-\1 researche~ have n~£un [o re~:{)gnt/~ tile ii~lr~rtanke (~1 representing intensIonal entitles (cl. \,V(x)ds 1975 . IIrachman 1979 . Mc('arthv 1979 . \lards and ~,hap~ro 1982 . It ~ems rea,~)nahle t|laI .~ ~mantlcs For such a repre'.~entatl()nal system should ~tself he an mtensmnal ~mant~cs. In tht~ paper. 1 ()utline ~,.'eral fully tntensttmal semantlc.S for ~nten,cltmal semantic net,x(~rk~, hv discu~sHag tile relatmns between a semantic-network "!anguage'" /, :~nd ~','eral ~anthdates For L w . For /,. I Focus on ~,haptro's propositional ,Semantic Network Processing System (SNell.': Shaptn) 1979). For which Israel (1983) has offered a I'w~sible-w~lrlds semantics. But p~stble-worlds semantic,s, while countenancing mtenmonal entities, are not fu/,/y intensional, since they treat mtens,mal entities extensionally. The L w s 1 di~uss all have t'ullv intenslonal components.
SNePS.
A SNePS semantic network (Fig. 3) A concept is "anything about whtch mlormat~on can he stored and/or transmitted" (Shapiro 197q: 179) . Widen a semantic network such as SNePS ~s u~d to model "the behel structure ol a thinking, rea.~onlnt.,, language using be,ng" (Matda and Shaptru 1982: 296: of. ~'; haplro 1971h: 51.) ,;. the ct)nt.epts are the oh)ectx of mental (i.e.. mtentu)nal) acts ..u~.h as thinking, behev:ng, wishing, etc. Such oblect,~ are mren~mal i~.t. Rapaport l()7g).
It t'ollov,'s I rc,m (%) that the arcs do not represent concepr-s. Rather. they repre',ent binary, structural relations between concept.s. If ~t )s des)red to talk about certain relations between concepts, then tho~e relations must be represented by nodes, smce they have r.neJt become objects o= thought, =.~, concepts. In terms of Oume's dictum that "t~ be is to be the value of a [hound] variable" (Qume 1980: 15; cf. Shapiro 1971a: 7q-80) . nodes represent such values, ar~s do not. That Is. given a domain of dlscours~--mcludlng ~tems, .'~ arv relations among them, and prolX)S~tions--SNeP% nodes ~,ouid be used to represent all members t)l the domain. The arcs are used to structure the items, relations, and p)(,I')()'~tJons ,)l the domain into ((:chef.) prl)p(~sltmns. As ~n analogy, SNel)% arcs are to %Nel). ~, nodes as the svmn()ls '~" and "+' are to the symbols %', '5.P'. ond "VI )' in the rewrite rule: S -, ";I ) + VI ). It ~s because m) prorxts~ t~ons :are represented hv arcs that SNel)% ts a "pr()rx)sltlonal" semantic network (c:. Maida and Shapiro 1982: 292) .
When a ~manttc network such as SNePS is u~d to model a mind, the nodes represent only intensional ~tems (Maida and Shapiro 1982; of. Rapaport 1978) . Simil-',rly, if such a network were to be used ~s a notation for a fully lntensional naturallanguage semantics (such as the semantics presented in Rapaport 198-1 ), the n(~es would represent only mtensional items. Thus, a semantics for such a network ought )tsetf to be fully mtensional.
There are two pairs of t3tpes of nodes in S.Nel)S: constant and variable nixies, and atomic (or individual) and molecular (or propositumal) nodes. (Molecular md~wdual nodes are currently being implemented: see Sect. 7. 8. For a dt~usstt)n ol tile semantics of varmble nodes, see ShaDro 1985.) Except for a few pre-de)ined arcs for u~ by an inference package, all arc labels are ~hosen by the user: such labels ,re completely arbitrary (albeit often mnemonic) and depend ,m the domain being represented. The "meanings" of the labels are provided (hv the u~rt only by means of explicit rule re)des. ',~.hlch allo~' the retrieval ,)r constructam (by referencing) of pr(~l'xtsltlonal ntvJes.
ISRAEL'S POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR SNePS.
David Israel's semantics f~r SS, ePS a~sumes "~he general framework of Knpke-\lontague style model theoretic a~counts" (Israel 1983: 3) , presumahlv because tie takes tt as "quite ~lear that [Malda and Shapiro] ... vnew their formahsm ,isa '~,lontague type type theoretic, inten,~uonal system" (Israel 1983: 2) . lie mtrc~luces "a domam I) ,,I i')()~.sible entitles, a non empty ,~t / ( . , Israet has dlthL.ultv mterpretln~ \II!MIII'.R. ('I.AS%. ,,nd [SA arcs in this Irame~x'~)rk. "l'hl~ is to be eM"~.tcd for tx~,,, reasons.
Ihr~r. i) is arguahtv a mistake to i~.terpret them (rather ~han g~,, mg rule~ lot them}, since they are arcs, hence arhttrarv and rainconceptual. Second, a pos.slhle-worlds semantics is not the best approach (nor ~s tt "clear" that this m what Ma=da and Shapiro had in mmd--indeed, they explicitly reject it: cf. Malda and Shapiro 1982: 2c)7}. Israel himself hints at the mapproprlatene.~ ol this approach:
H" one )s l'(~u.~ing on prop(~monal attitude{s} ... =t can seem hke a waste ol time to mtroduce m(Mel-the~ret)~, accounts()l'intens.)nahrv at all. Thus the air of de~F)erat)on alx~ut the loregomg attempt .... (Israel !O83: 5.) More~wer--and sigmficantlv--a possible-worlds approach ms misguided it' ,,ne wants to be able tn represent intpossible oh)errs..~r, ,,ne should want to it" one ts doing natural-language semanttcs (Rapa- 
MEINONG'S TIIEORY OF OKJEC'TS.
A!cxlus Metnong's (19(M) theory of the oh)e~ts of psvchologl~i acts ~s a more appropriate foundation for a semantics of propositional semantic networks as well a.s for a natural-language semantics. in brier, 5,1emong's the()rv camsists of the f~)llo~ing theses (c|'. Rapap)rt 1976, 1978):
(MI) Thes/s oj" Intentionality: livery mental act (e.g., thmkmg, believing, judging, etc.) is "directed" towards an "ob.)ect". l'here are two kmds of Memongian objects: (I) objecta, the individual-like oh}ectx of such a mental act as thmking-of, and (2) objectives, the proposttlon-hke objects tat such mental acts as believlng(-that) or knowing(-that). E.g.. the object of my act of thinking of a unicorn is: a unicorn; the object or mv act of believing that the I~rth is flat is: the Earth is flat.
(M2) Not every object of thought exists (technically, "has being").
(M3) It is not self-contradictory to deny. nor tautologous to al'firm.
existence of an object of thought.
(M4) Thesis of Au~sersein: All objects of thought are ausserse/~nd ("beyond being and non-being").
For present pur~
Aussersein ts most easily explicated as a domain of quantification for non-existentially-loaded quanttfiers. It should be obvious that there is a close relationship between Memong's theory and a rullv mtensnonat ~mantlc network hke %NePS. SNel)S it.'.,elf ts much hke .4usse~ein; %haplro (personal communication) has said that all nixies are :mpIncntlv m the network ,ill the ume. In particular, a SNePS base (i.e.. attempt constant) n(xJe represents an ohlectum, and a %NePS pr(q'x~ltn(mal nixie represents :in ,~hlt~tnve. Thus. when %NeP% ,s used as a mtx.lel ~,1 ,~ mind. pr(q'xxstttonal taxies represent the able, tires ol behels (d. Matda and ~hapnro 1982. Rapal'~rt and ~,hapiro 1984. Raparxwt !984b;; and When S\-l )':, t,¢ used xn a natural language pr(x:e~.,~ing system tcf. Shaptn) 1982. Rapal~)rt and %hapirn 1984). Lndivtdual nixies represent the meanmgs ill' noun phra~s and verb phrases, and pr(arx~slttonal taxies represent the meannng'~ (af sentences.
Memong's theory wa.s attacked by llertrand Ru~setl tan gr, aunds of inconsistency: (1) According t(a Meinong, :he round square is boil: round and square (mdeed. this ,s a tautology); vet. according to Rus~ll. ~i" ~t is r(aund, then ~t ~s not square. (2) %lm~-larlv, the extsung .~{)lden mounuHn must ha;e .ill three of its 
RAPAPOIIT'S THEORY.
On my own reconstruction of Meinong's theory (Rapaport 1976 (Rapaport , 1978 --which bears a coincidental r~mblance to McCarthy 1979). there are two types of objecLs: M-objecta (i.e~ the objects of thought, which are intensional) and actual objects (which are extensional). There are two modes of predication of properties to these: M-objects are constituted by properties, and both M-and actual objects can exemplify properties. For instance, the pen with which l wrote the manumnpt of this paper is an actual object that exemplifies the property of being while. Right now. when I think about that pen. the object of my thought is an M-oblect that is constitLaed (in part) by that property. The M-object Jan's pen can be represented as: <belonging to Jan. being a pen> (or. for short, as: *J. P>). Ileing a pen is also a constituent of this M-object: P c <J. P >; and 'Jan% pen is a pen' is true in virtue of this objective.
[n addition. <J. P > exemplifies (ex) the property of being constituzed by two properties. There might be an actual (abject, .say. ~. corresrxmding to <J. P >, that exemplifies the property of being a pen (iv ex /" ) as well as (say) the property of being 6 inches &rag. But being 6 inches long ¢ ('J. l" ",.
"['he M-object the round square. • R. A' ",. IS c,nstntuted bv precn~ly two properties: being round ( R ) and being ~uare (S): "The round square is round' is true m virtue of this. and 'The round ~uare ts not .~luare" ts fal~ ,n virtue of it. But (R, S > exemplifies neither of thine pn)pertles, and 'The round ~quare ts not ~uare" ts The mtensmnal fragment ol this theory can he used to provnde it semantics I.r %NeP% m mut.h the ,~lme way that It can been u.,~d ttl provide a ,,emanttt.s lt)r natural languaEe (Rapap(irt 1981). %Nel)9; hase nodes can t~ taken to represent \1 t~b~ecta and prl)pertles; %Nel)% prt}rx~ltlimal IIIM'kN L.n i've taken t(~ represent \1 oh~ectlves.
Twu ,ilternatixe'~ ix,r networks, rcpre'-~:nIlnL, tile three \| ,ff~lectlves:
.%' L • R.S ,..rod ,R.S;, ex bein e iml~ible are ~,ho~.~. n in l:ig,~. 4 ,nil 5. Ir}le ,,¢.,Lolid Lan }~' it,ceil t()d~.iud "'('lark's 
PARSONS'S THEORY.
Terence Parsons's theory of nonexistent oh]eeLs (1980; cf. Rapa~x~rt 1976 cf. Rapa~x~rt . 1978 .5) recognizes only one type of ob]ect--intenstonal ones--and onl~" one m(xle of predlcatton. But it has two types ill" properties: nuclea~ and extranuclea~. Tile tormer includes all "ordinary" properties such as: being red. being round, etc.; the latter includes such properties as: existing, being ~ml~t~sthJe. etc. I~u[ the thstlnctnon ts SlurrY, s, nce for each extranuclear pn~perty, there Is a ct)rresl~)ndlng nuclear one. J:or ever',' set ~d nuclear prtt pertles, there Ix a unique ohlect that has ~nls," rh,w,e prt~l~rt~es. Existing ohlects must he ct~mplete (and. ~tf ct~urse, ctmslstent).
though not all such ohle~ts exist. For instance, the Morning Star and the I:'vening Slat don't exist (tl th~ are taken to ct)nsnst, roughly, of only two properties each). I'he ~ound square, of course.
ts (and only ls~ hits round and square ,and. ~, ~sn't non-square; through tt is. for that rea~am, lmp~.xsd~le, hence not real. .-ks for the existing golden mountain, exintence ix extranuclear. ~l the set ~1 these three properties doesn't Ila~.e a cttrre.~p~mtlung ~)htect. There is, however, a "'watered do~ n". nuclear ~ersion ,~1 existence, and there is an ex=stm~ golden mountain that has Ihat property; hut it didn't ha',e the extranuclear property ~,1 existence, and. '~ ~t doesn't exist.
Parstms's the~lrv could pn~ tdea semantics for SNeI>S. though the use of two types of properties pla~ restrictions on the po~tble uses of SNePS. On the other hand, SNePS could he used to represent Parsons's theory (though a device would be needed for marking the d~sttoctlon between nuclear and extranuclear properties) and, hence. tt~ether with I)arrams's natural language semantics, to provide a hX)t f(}r comptit:ttit)nal linguistics. Fig. h suggests how tilts might be d~me.
Fi~. 6. A SNePS representation of
The round square is round, square, and impossible' on Parsons's th~orT.
CASTANIrDA'S THEORY.
Ilector-N~ri Castan'eda's theory of "guises" (1972, 1975a-c. 1977, 197q. 1980 things-under-a-descrtptmn. ~,s "facets" of (physical and nonphysical) ob.l~t.s, as "roles" that ohjecr,s play, or, in general, as objects t)l" thought.
Gui~ theory has two modes of predication: internal and external In general, the gui~ cl... F... } is-internally t'. I:..g., the gut~ (named by) the round square is-mternally only round and square. The two guises the tallest mountain and &It. Everest are related hv an external mode of predication called consubstantialion (C'*). Consuh~tantmtnon is an equivalence relation that is u~d in the analyses of (I) external predication, (2) Amtther e\ternal nl,~e td' predt~atl~)n ~x ~,msociati,..n (('").
This ts al~ an equivalence relalltm, hut t~ne that holds between gu0se~ that a m0nd has "put together". ~.e.. between gulwes m "behef space". I'(~r unsran~.e, (" "(llamlet. the Prm~,e ~f I)enmark J.
(" anti C" ct~rre~p~md alm~sr exactly r(~ tile use ~t tile I'OUIV art sn 'q,NePS. \lalda and Shap~n~ ~I'IS2: );1131~ u.~ the I-{)UIV ca~-frame to represent t,o relerence f ~vhlch us ~hat ('" us), hut, .~s I have suggested In RapaI~rt lt~84h. I:(J('l\" m~re prnpertv repre~ntx believed ct~ relerence--~A,'hl~.h Is '~'ltat (''= IS. It sht~uld he clear h,~ gu:~ the~rv can pnw~de a ~mantncs It)r 'qNeP%. Ilg. 7 ";ugge'~ls h~v. thus m~t, ht h~ done. %~nle pn~hlems remain, ho,x ever: in p.lrtlcular, the need t~ pn:,tde ,= SXeP ~, ~t~rrel,te lt}r mter hal predt~,at~t~n and the retlu~renlent ~1 explicating external predication In terms ~1 retatl~n~', like (" . Note. h~, tha! nt~des m3. mS. and m8 in F!y. 7 ;ire 'structured illdl~.ldtl.~ls '" -a ,~rt ~1 molecular h;~se nixie.
g. CON(~L USION.
It ~s p~,sthle rn provide a tully tntenslonal, nt)n-fx~,'~ahle-w(~rlds ~malltlCS for ~NePS and similar ,~emanttc net~.v~rk f(wmal tsms. "l he tnt~t strat~,htlttr~.vard way ,s h~ use ~,letmmg's thet~rv ~)l ohlects, though thus the~rv has tile dx.,,ad~antage ,~t not being f~,rmah/¢d. There are several extant formal ~.|emon~lan theorte~ that can t~ u.sed, t|t~;u~h eaLh has L.ertaln dt~tdvantages or pn~hl~mr;. Two hnes ,ff ,e~earch are currently being inv,~;tlgate~d: (1) Take ~.Nel~F, as :s. and prnvide a nov,', formal Memonglan theory I',~r Its semanth.: ~~,u,'tdatl~)n. Thin has not been discussed here. hut the wav to do this sh~luid be clear: from the p~.s.slhtlittes examined ab~lve. My t~v,'n theory (strspped of Its exten~mnal IragmentJ ~)r a m(Cdl~;:il~n (~| (',istaRetia'y~ rllel~rv ~'enl tile me,st pronll~ln~ appn~:u.he~. {2~ Modnlv S~.eP% '~ that ~n~ ,,I the extant lormal \lenn~;n~.)an ttl,t~rtc.s can ~ ,a~ used. S3,eP~ ~s, nn fact, ~.urrentIv |~nn[. m,~dlhed hv tile SNePS Research [intup-lor independent rea..-a,l'.S -'n v,'avN that make it cheer to ('.=,,talleda's guise theory, hv :he tnt."(xlUCtlon of structured mdt~,uduals--"hase nodes" with descending arcs for indicating their "internal ~tructure". 
